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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #5172-80/1
23 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [redacted]

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1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. [redacted]

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2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 22 July with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [redacted]

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4. Following the meeting, [redacted] who attended the part dealing with Somalia, telephoned to say that he was highly satisfied with the discussion. He requested that we keep very close watch over what will be "a very difficult and delicate situation" over the next few months, particularly if we sign an agreement. He requested that we continue to take explicit stock of developments for the immediate future in the Horn

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
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and that the present level of detailed judgments be maintained. He has forwarded a memorandum with his observations on this point to the White House. I would appreciate any comment you may hear on his memorandum.



L. Gray Cowan

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Attachment
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SUBJECT: Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 21

1. It appears from this month's warning meeting that several of the potential crisis areas of Africa may be taking a summer vacation. ☐

25X1

SOMALIA/ETHIOPIA

2. It was the general consensus that the judgment expressed two months ago, namely, that a full-scale Ethiopian invasion of Somalia was not imminent, still holds. It appears likely that the Ethiopians may be reopening the Eritrean front with substantial Soviet advice and assistance, and some analysts felt that, if this campaign is successful, it will have the effect of freeing additional Ethiopian troops to be applied to a later attack on northern Somalia. However, we do not foresee this happening within the next three months. More or less intense ground fighting and air attacks will continue in the Ogaden however. ☐

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3. There are indications that the Soviets, through diplomatic contacts, are applying pressure on the Somalis not to sign an agreement with the United States. But it was suggested that the existence of a "pro-Soviet faction" in the Somali government that is said to be trying to persuade Siad not to sign may well be simply a ploy on his part to pressure the U.S. into a more satisfactory agreement. ☐

25X1

4. The hypothesis was advanced that the Soviets may, in fact, want us to gain base rights at Berbera. They could then blame future instability in Somalia on the United States and would reap propaganda benefits if the U.S. were to be thrown out of Somalia at a later point. The further Soviet propaganda point that U.S. bases in the western Indian Ocean serve only to create wider instability in the area as a whole would be reinforced by any failure of the U.S.-Somali agreement. ☐

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UGANDA

5. The general feeling was expressed that the elections might not come off as scheduled later this year in view of the increasing violence and interparty strife becoming evident during the pre-election period. Some analysts felt, however, that preparations for the elections were going better than might have been expected. Nyerere might well prefer to see free elections in September in Uganda because any serious unraveling

*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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of the Ugandan situation would inevitably affect the presidential and legislative elections scheduled to be held in Tanzania on October 26. It was generally agreed that neither Moi nor Nimeiri can do very much to affect the outcome of the Ugandan elections even though they may both strongly wish to see Obote defeated. []

25X1

TANZANIA

6. Analysts felt that there was a good chance of increasing violence in Tanzania prior to the elections there. We do not exclude the possibility that an attempt may be made on Nyerere's life in the period before the elections, particularly in view of reports of increased grumbling among junior officers in the army and the continued deterioration of the economy. It was emphasized, however, that this was a matter of concern and not of alarm at the present time. The consensus was that Nyerere would retain the presidency, although with a substantially reduced majority. []

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ZIMBABWE

7. It was the general consensus that the situation in Zimbabwe was deteriorating somewhat faster than we had earlier anticipated. In the face of the resignation of General Walls, Mugabe is going to have to maintain a tight hold on the situation. Much depends on his ability to control his own party, his skill in finding a replacement for Walls, and the reaction of the white community over the next three months. The forthcoming local elections in October will be an additional test of his strength. We do not foresee the situation becoming critical within the next three months, but there undoubtedly will be a rocky road for Zimbabwe in the immediate future. []

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LIBERIA

8. It was the general feeling that the situation in Liberia was continuing to deteriorate in the absence of the ability of the Doe government to rebuild either the society or the economy. We foresee a further rise in internal disorder unless the government is able to maintain control of the labor situation, assuage the fears of expatriate business, and arrange for substantial external financing. []

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9. Apparently, the Soviets have decided that the Doe government is here to stay and is not just a passing phase since they have extended an invitation to Doe to visit Moscow. The question is whether Doe, were he to undertake the visit, is sufficiently sophisticated to carry on any meaningful dialogue with the Soviets. Disagreement over whether Doe should accept the Moscow invitation has revealed growing antagonisms within the PRC and between the military and the civilian members of government. []

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